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Within an incomplete contract setting, the paper analyses the role of third parties in ameliorating incentive 
problems arising in the context of financial contracts with costly verification. Contrary to the findings of the 
bilateral lender-borrower relationship, characterised by no information revelation and a breakdown of the 
market, it is shown that, in the presence of third parties, an optimal contract exists and has partial information 
revelation. The importance of third parties is therefore not limited to improving efficiency, as it is when the 
contract offer comes from the informed party, but to ensure project realisation, and thus to ensure that the surplus 
that can arise from the project does not get lost. 
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Several studies in recent years have focused on the design of the optimal principal-agent contract when
the agent has private information which is costly to verify and the veriﬁcation strategy is non-contractible.
In these cases the revelation principle does not apply and the contract must be set so as to provide the
incentive to monitor (Hart, 1995). The literature has proposed two ways to achieve this: 1. give the
incentives to the principal to monitor, by fully reimbursing her of the veriﬁcation cost incurred even when
monitoring detects compliance, so as to induce the agent to truthfully reveal his cash ﬂows (Jost (1996),
Persons (1997)); 2. have the agent “misrepresenting” the true state with positive probability, thus using
the possibility of punishing the agent for false reporting as an incentive to monitor (Khalil (1997), Persons
(1997), Choe (1998), Khalil and Parigi (1998)). When the act of monitoring is not publicly observable,
the ﬁrst of these alternatives is not implementable (Menichini and Simmons, 2002).1 The incentive to
monitor can thus arise only from the possibility of collecting a penalty for detected false reporting, and
a contract inducing some misrepresentation in equilibrium will arise, i.e. a contract in which there is
diversion of cash ﬂows. The occurrence of this scenario, however, relies either on the assumption that
the agent has all the bargaining power, or, when it is the principal who has the bargaining power, that
the penalty for non-compliance is set exogenously and can exceed the agent’s total income, as in Khalil
(1997).2
This paper studies the eﬀects on the properties of the optimal contract of giving all the bargaining
power to the uninformed party, while setting the penalty for misreporting endogenously. In particular
we study the properties of the contract oﬀered by a risk neutral lender to a risk neutral borrower when
the latter has private information about the return of a ﬁxed size investment project which the lender
can verify at a cost. We show that, under limited liability, the joint eﬀect of lender’s bargaining power
and contractual incompleteness rules out borrower’s compliance and leads to an equilibrium in which
1To be viable, this route requires repayments to be contingent upon veriﬁcation: the monitor is fully covered of the
veriﬁcation cost incurred when monitoring detects compliance and the contract induces full information revelation. However,
if veriﬁcation is non-observable or non-veriﬁable and there is no hard evidence in support of the monitor’s claim, the monitor
will always claim to have monitored even if she has not in order to cash the reward for monitoring (the reimbursement of
the veriﬁcation cost). To prevent this, repayments following a truthful monitored low state report cannot be contingent
upon monitoring.
2If the agent has the power to set the contract terms, he can hold the principal down to her reservation utility, keeping
any residual left in truthful reporting. This increases both the expected cost of deception for the agent and the expected
beneﬁt of monitoring for the principal: because the principle of maximum deterrence holds, detected misreporting implies
the loss of the entire surplus and its collection by the principal. When the punishment for misreporting is set exogenously
and can exceed the agent’s total income, non-compliance involves a net cost for the agent.
1the borrower’s reporting strategy is to always claim the worst state to have occurred, while the lender’s
monitoring strategy depends only on the size of observation cost. When this is suﬃciently high relative
to the expected return from monitoring, the lender will no longer have an incentive to monitor and will
get a payoﬀ no higher than the worst state cash ﬂows. This has dramatic implications when the lender is
called to ﬁnance an investment project of ﬁxed size, since the worst state cash ﬂows fall short of the size
of the loan: in such circumstances the project has negative NPV for the lender and will not be ﬁnanced,
thus causing a breakdown of the market and a consequential welfare loss. When the observation cost is
suﬃciently low, knowing that she can catch a lying borrower, the lender has still an incentive to monitor
and get the exact repayment. Thus a contract with partial or no information disclosure and deterministic
monitoring arises.
We argue that these equilibria are very costly and that it is possible to do better by involving a third
party with the role of mitigating the agent’s incentive to lie, even when the monitor has all the bargaining
power. In particular, we show that the incentive to cheat is reduced when a second risk averse ﬁnancier,
who has neither bargaining nor monitoring power, is called to coﬁnance the investment project. The tool
for controlling this incentive is the structure of repayments. In the bilateral setup the borrower gets his
reservation utility in all states with any rent entirely seized by the monitor. Introducing a third party
a l l o w st h em o n i t o rt os t r u c t u r er e p a y m e n t ss oa st ol e a v ear e n tt ot h eb o r r o w e ri nt r u t h f u l l yr e p o r t e d
non defaulting states. This increases the borrower’s incentive to comply and, through the higher premium
for detected misreporting, the lender’s incentive to monitor, thus inducing partial information revelation
and project realisation. Third parties can thus oﬀset the negative eﬀects on the investment decision of a
given allocation of bargaining power.
The reason for these results has to do with the number of tools available to control incentives in
each of the settings considered. In the bilateral setup, one instrument, the repayments to the monitor,
is used to regulate two incentives, the lender’s incentive to monitor and the borrower’s incentive to
comply. In particular, to boost the borrower’s incentives to disclose information any low state return is
to be transferred to the monitor; however, this worsens her monitoring incentives, as she receives a sure
repayment even if she decides not to monitor. Thus, stronger incentives for one side make it harder to
provide incentives for the other. When a third party is called to participate to the venture, the repayments
to her can be used to better control the incentives. In particular, the third party gets the full right to
the low state return, improving both the lender’s incentive to monitor and the borrower’s incentive to
comply, and thereby reducing the expected monitoring cost. This in turn liberates resources that can be
used to reward the complying borrower, thus further improving reporting and monitoring incentives.
In studying the eﬀects of the allocation of bargaining power on the properties of the optimal lender-
2borrower contract when commitment to monitor is assumed away, this paper is close to Choe (1998).
Assuming costly misreporting - e.g. lying involves a falsiﬁcation cost - he shows that only a misrepre-
sentation contract can arise and that the allocation of the bargaining initiative only aﬀects the eﬃciency
properties of the contract. Within a context in which the principal/lender designs the contract but the
agent/borrower is liable for an exogenous bounded penalty that can exceed his total income in case of
detected misreporting, Khalil (1997) also ﬁnds that a misrepresentation contract arises. An exception
in this scenario is Menichini (2001): assuming away falsiﬁcation cost (as in Choe, 1998) and exogenous
penalty for misreporting (as in Khalil, 1997) and considering endogenous investment size, she ﬁnds that a
misrepresentation contract never arises, but only a pooling contract in which the borrower always cheats.
With respect to Menichini (2001), the main contribution of our work is to focus on the role of third
parties and consider not only mixed strategy and pooling equilibria, but all the feasible equilibria which
can be supported at the contracting stage. However, this is not the ﬁrst paper that analyses multiple
lending relationships as a tool for mitigating incentive problems within this setting. Persons (1997) and
Menichini and Simmons (2002) have already taken up this issue, the former focusing on truth-telling con-
tracts, the latter on misrepresentation contracts. They both have pointed out the role that third parties
play in increasing eﬃciency, rather than ensuring project realisation, as the present paper. Moreover,
neither of them has looked at the interplay in the design of the optimal contract between the allocation
of bargaining power and multiple parties, as we do.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets up the model assumptions and the time-line of the
game. Section 3 presents the benchmark single investor contract, studying the implications of contractual
incompleteness and the allocation of bargaining power. Section 4 introduces third parties and studies
their role in ameliorating incentive problems. The last section concludes.
2 The Model Assumptions
A risk neutral borrower (B)h a saﬁxed size project I for which he needs ﬁnance from one or more lenders.
The outcome of the project, fs,s∈ {H,L}, with s = H occurring with probability p, is the borrower’s
private information. We assume that fH >I>f L, and that all parties are protected by limited liability.
The project can be ﬁnanced by two (groups of) lenders, with (endogenous) investment shares α and 1−α
respectively: a monitoring one (PM), that can rely at a cost φ on a monitoring technology to verify the
outcome of the project, and a non monitoring one (PNM), who free-rides on the other lender’s audit.3
3Allowing for a single monitor only can be justiﬁed on grounds of eﬃciency. Within our setup, having a second monitor
entails only a duplication of monitoring costs and therefore an eﬃciency loss (Diamond, 1984).
3The monitoring lender is indispensable: under no monitoring, the borrower can only be induced to reveal
his private information by setting repay m e n t sw h i c ha r en o ni n c r e a s i n gi nc a s hﬂows. Because of limited
liability, this implies that in any state the highest total transfer lenders can get never exceeds fL, which
is less than the total investment outﬂow I. Anticipating that the project has negative NPV, no ﬁnance
is ever provided by any investor.
The two lenders have diﬀerent risk attitudes: the monitoring one is risk neutral, while the non
monitoring one is risk averse.4 T h i sc a nb ei n t e r p r e t e di nt h el i g h to ft h ee x i s t i n ge v i d e n c eo nt h eu s eo f
multiple credit sources both in developed and LDC countries. For example, Petersen and Rajan (1994,
1995) present evidence on multiple credit sources for small businesses in the US: many ﬁrms borrow
from more than one bank and take trade credit from sellers. In some cases they borrow both from
local lenders and well established ﬁnancial institutions. In LDC’s, credit markets are characterised by
formal and informal credit (Hoﬀ and Stiglitz, 1990 and 1997): private money-lenders and family-related
informal ﬁnancial arrangements interacting with banks and formal ﬁnancial intermediaries. In either
case, the various types of lenders have diﬀerent characteristics in terms of market power, risk attitudes,
monitoring ability, ability to raise funds or diversify loans. Although in a very simple and stylised way,
our assumptions aim at capturing some of these diﬀerences.
Monitoring technology
Monitoring is non-veriﬁable. Thus, neither the act, nor the result of it is observable to third parties.
To credibly communicate them, the monitor must be able to produce hard, informative evidence of the
borrowers ﬁnancial position. Because of non-veriﬁability, such evidence is only available if it diﬀers from
the report originally sent by the borrower,5 that is to say when the borrower reports a bad realisation of
the state and the monitor ﬁnds that it is in fact good. In such cases the evidence displayed is a proof
that monitoring has occurred and repayments are monitoring-contingent. When instead the report of
the borrower and the result of monitoring do not diﬀer, it is not possible to say whether monitoring did
actually occur and diﬀerences in payments cannot be supported in equilibrium.6 Given non veriﬁability,
4A similar assumption based on lenders’ diﬀerential risk attitudes is used also by Bloise and Reichlin (2003).
5It is not possible to falsify the evidence.
6If they diﬀered, lender and borrower might collude at the expense of the third party. In particular, if, following a report
ˆ L, low state repayments were contingent on claimed monitoring, the monitoring lender would collude with the borrower,
claiming to have monitored when in fact she has not, if the repayment received under monitoring is higher than that received
under no monitoring, and claiming not to have monitored otherwise.
Collusion issues aside, relaxing the hypothesis of non-veriﬁability, so as to make also low state repayments monitoring-
contingent, would not change the results of the analysis in the bilateral setup: optimally these repayments would be set
equal to each other. It would sharpen incentives instead in a multi-investors setup. Thus, these beneﬁts would add up to
4the actual frequency of monitoring is also non-observable, which implies that monitoring cannot be
contracted upon, i.e. the lender cannot commit to any monitoring strategy at the contract time. This
implies that truthtelling cannot be elicited and the lender has to be provided with the incentives to
monitor.
Contracts and repayments structure
The monitoring lender PM has a monopoly power which gives her the possibility to set the contract
terms. She oﬀers a contract to both the borrower B and to the non-monitoring investor PNM, specifying
the share of the loan provided by the non-monitoring lender and a set of contingent transfers from the
borrower to the monitoring and non-monitoring lenders covering all veriﬁable states of the world.7
The structure of the repayments is as follows. After revenues are realised, the borrower sends a report
ˆ s and a proposed repayment to the lenders. When s = H, the borrower can tell the truth or cheat
(ˆ s ∈ { ˆ H, ˆ L}). If he tells the truth (ˆ s = ˆ H), which occurs with probability (1 − l), the borrower never
monitors8 and the repayments to PM and PNM are RH,w H respectively. If he cheats (ˆ s = ˆ L), which
occurs with probability l, PM can monitor with probability m. In this case the repayments to PM and
PNM are RHL = RH + δR,w HL = wH + δw, respectively. When s = L, the borrower never cheats
(ˆ s = ˆ L)9, and the transfer to the monitoring and non-monitoring investors are RL,w L respectively.10
Thus, the reporting-monitoring subgame can only take place when the borrower reports low.
Time-line
1. B privately observes his type (H,L).
2. PM proposes a contract to both B (who is fully informed) and PNM. They can either accept or
reject. If they both accept, they sign the contract and the game continues. If either of them refuses,
the next stages of the game do not occur.
3. Upon revenues realisation, B chooses which report to make and, conditional on the report received,
PM decides whether to monitor or not.
4. The relevant transfers are made.
those of having a third party, but would not substitute for it.
7Alternative structures might be thought of in this context, which we will describe more thoroughly in the appendix.
However, they can all be reconducted in the framework of section 3.
8Monitoring a high state report is a dominated strategy for the monitoring investor.
9When the low state occurs, it is a dominated strategy to declare high.
10Because no hard evidence can be produced showing whether monitoring has taken place, the repayment to the monitoring
investor cannot be conditioned on monitoring.
5We solve the problem by backward induction. The expected returns to each party are:
EπB|H =( 1− l)(fH − RH − wH)+l[(1 − m)(fH − RL − wL)+m(fH − RH − δR − wH − δw)] (1)
EπB|L = fL − RL − wL (2)
EπM = p(1 − l)RH +( 1− p + pl)(1 − m)RL +( 1− p)m(RL − φ)+plm(RH + δR − φ) − αI (3)
EUNM = p(1 − l)U (wH − (1 − α)I)+plmU (wH + δw − (1 − α)I)+ (4)
(1 − p + pl(1 − m))U (wL − (1 − α)I) − u
where (1) and (2) are the borrower expected proﬁts,11 (3) is the monitoring lender expected proﬁts, and
(4) is the non-monitoring lender VNM utility function deﬁned on repayments conditional on each possible
state.
2.1 The reporting-monitoring game
With non-contractible monitoring and the above repayment structure, repayments that induce truth-
telling fail to give commitment to monitor. Instead, at the interim stage, l and m will be determined as
a BNE of the game between the borrower and the monitoring lender.
From (1) and (3), the best responses of the borrower and the monitor are set by:
l

   




if RH + wH − (1 − m)(RL + wL) − m(RH + δR + wH + δw) Q 0
m

   




if pl(RH + δR − φ) − (1 − p + pl)RL +( 1− p)(RL − φ) Q 0
Among the possible equilibria, we focus here on a mixed strategy one, with random monitoring and
partial information revelation. In the appendix we consider all the other possible equilibria relative to
the single investor case. Of these, some are infeasible, as they involve the borrower always repaying
R ≤ fL, which is insuﬃcient to repay the lenders’ investment I.12
11Notice that, because the borrower has private information at the contracting stage, his expected proﬁts are set in
ex-post terms.
12A complete list of all equilibria for the case in which there is a single monitoring investor is provided by Simmons and
Garino (2003) in a context in which it is the borrower and not the lender who has the power to set the contract terms and
monitoring is observable. Because of these diﬀerences, the set of feasible equilibria is not the same across the two cases.
6A Nash equilibrium in interior mixed strategies requires:
∂EπB
∂l
= RH + wH − (1 − m)(RL + wL) − m(RH + δR + wH + δw)=0 (5)
∂EπM
∂m
= pl(RH + δR − RL − φ) − (1 − p)φ =0 . (6)
Notice that in order to maximise the lender’s incentive to monitor δw =0 , i.e. wHL = wH. This is
because the marginal beneﬁt of monitoring (6) is increasing in δR, while the marginal beneﬁto fl y i n g( 5 )
is decreasing in the total penalty for detected misreporting. Thus, while setting δR as high as possible
(and δw as low as possible) has a neutral eﬀect on (5), it makes the lender strictly prefer to monitor
requiring l to fall to restore indiﬀerence.
Setting δw =0 , the interior mixed strategy is deﬁned by:
l =
(1 − p)φ
p(RH + δR − RL − φ)
; (7)
m =
RH + wH − RL − wL
RH + δR + wH − RL − wL
. (8)
Then, if it is optimal to have a mixed strategy, the following conditions must hold: m ∈ [0,1] requires




We can use the equilibrium strategies to solve for the optimal contract: anticipating time three
probabilities of lying and monitoring (7) and (8), the monitoring lender PM c h o o s e sr e p a y m e n t st o
maximise her expected proﬁts, subject to the borrower and to the non-monitoring investor participation
constraints ((1), (2) and (4)), and to the limited liability condition fH ≥ RH + wH + δR.
2.2 The contract problem
Using the indiﬀerence conditions (5) and (6) (and δw =0 ), the optimal contract conditional on a mixed
strategy equilibrium is the solution to the following programme PMI:
max
α,RH,RL,δR,wH,wL
p(1 − l)RH +( 1− p + pl)RL − αI (9)
s.t. fH − wH − RH ≥ 0 (10)
fL − wL − RL ≥ 0 (11)
fH − wH − RH − δR ≥ 0 (12)
µU (wH − (1 − α)I)+( 1− µ)U (wL − (1 − α)I) ≥ ¯ u (13)
where µ = p−pl+plm, (10) and (11) are the ex post participation constraints for the borrower, (12) is a
limited liability condition for the borrower,13 (13) is the participation constraint for the non-monitoring
13This assumption (Sappington, 1983) plays a similar role as the borrower’s risk aversion. It implies that, in spite of risk
neutrality, a ﬁr s tb e s tc o n t r a c ti sn o ti m p l e m e n t a b l e .
7lender and l and m are the equilibrium probabilities of lying and monitoring as deﬁned by (7) and (8).
The solution to this programme is postponed until section 4. In the next section we consider the
benchmark case in which there is a single monitoring investor.14
3 The benchmark: the single investor contract




p(1 − l)RH +( 1− p + pl)RL − I (14)
s.t. fH − RH ≥ 0 (15)
fL − RL ≥ 0 (16)
fH − RH − δR ≥ 0 (17)
where the constraints have the same meaning as in programme PSI and the probabilities of lying and
monitoring are deﬁned as l =
(1 − p)φ
p(RH + δR − RL − φ)
,m=
RH − RL
RH + δR − RL
.
We ﬁrst see that the low state participation constraint binds: if not, the monitor could raise RL to
her beneﬁt.16 Hence RL = fL. Moreover, the objective function is increasing both in δR and RH, but
it increases faster in RH.17 The participation constraint (15) sets however a limit on the size of RH : it
cannot exceed fH, which implies, using (17), that the problem involves a corner solution with δR =0 ,a s





Figure 1: δR =0
14This case has been studied by Menichini (2001) within a setup with endogenous project size.
15This case corresponds to the decentralised contractual structure represented in ﬁgure 2 in appendix.
16The objective function (14) is increasing in RL :
∂obj
∂RL






17Ar i s ei nRH has two eﬀects on the objective function: a direct one - the objective varies by p(1 − l), the probability
of receiving a high state report - and an indirect one, through the eﬀect that such a rise has in reducing the probability
of lying. A rise in δR, instead, aﬀects only indirectly the objective function by reducing in the probability of lying. Thus:
∂obj







8If δR =0 , lying is costless, which, under the assumption that the lender adopts a random monitoring
strategy, makes the borrower strictly prefer to lie: the marginal beneﬁt of lying is strictly positive - (5)
becomes (1 − m)(RH − RL) > 0 - which implies that l =1 . Thus, no interior mixed strategy is possible
in this case.
The only other feasible equilibria which can be supported at the contracting stage, so long as the
observation cost is not too high, are the following:18
• m = l =1 , with observation cost φ;
• m =1 , 0 <l<1, with expected observation cost (1 − p + pl)φ.
We thus derive the following result:
Proposition 1 Under the described forms of contractual incompleteness and lender’s bargaining power,
for suﬃciently low observation cost, only contracts with deterministic monitoring are implementable with
partial or no information revelation. No other contract is implementable for higher observation cost.
Partial information revelation can thus only be elicited under deterministic monitoring. The intuition
behind this result is the following: by designing the contract, the lender can hold the borrower down to
his reservation utility in each state. This reduces the opportunity cost of misreporting and increases the
incentive to cheat: the only way for the borrower to get a rent is by lying, independently of the lender’s
decision to monitor. When the observation cost is not too high, anticipating that she will always catch
a lying borrower, the lender has still an incentive to monitor and get the exact repayment. When the
observation cost is higher than the expected return from monitoring, the lender has no longer an incentive
to monitor. Anticipating that she will never recoup the investment outlay,19 there is no contract that she
is willing to oﬀer to the borrower and hence a breakdown of the market.
This result crucially depends on the assumption of ﬁxed project size and on endogenous punishment for
misreporting. In particular, if the size of the loan was determined endogenously, then I could be chosen
so as to ensure the feasibility of other equilibria,20 although not of a mixed strategy one. If instead
the punishment for misreporting was imposed exogenously, for example by asking the entrepreneur to
provide a collateral as a guarantee for the loan received, it could be even possible to restore a mixed
strategy equilibrium. Because the collateral could only be seized if monitoring occurs, the lender could
not substitute the punishment for misreporting (δR) with a higher payoﬀ for truthful high state reports
18The full derivation of the results is in the appendix.
19If the borrower reports low and the lender never monitors, the most she gets is fL <I .
20Menichini (2001) has discussed the case of endogenous project size in which I is reduced suﬃciently so as to ensure the
feasibility of a single repayment (pooling) contract paying fL (I) in each state.
9(RH), as when the punishment is endogenous. This would restore the lender’s incentive to monitor and
mitigate the entrepreneur’s incentive to lie.
We propose here an alternative way-out to restore the monitoring incentives and elicit information
revelation, thereby increasing eﬃciency: allow for multiple investors.
4M u l t i p l e i n v e s t o r s
This section shows that, even with endogenous penalty for misreporting, the introduction of a second
investor allows the monitor to implement a contract with random monitoring and partial information
revelation dominating any two-party contract with deterministic monitoring.
Solving programme PMI, we derive the following proposition:
Proposition 2 In the presence of third uninformed parties, the optimal contract conditional on a mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium is characterised by:
• positive share of ﬁnance provided by each lender: α>0;
• maximum punishment to the borrower in non-truthful audited states (RHL = RH +δR = fH −wH);
positive rent in high reported states (fH − RH − wH > 0) a n dz e r or e n ti nl o wr e p o r t e ds t a t e s ,i f
audited or not (fL = RL + wL);
• negative correlation between repayments to each lender, i.e. RH >R L =0and wH <w L = fL.
Proof. In Appendix.
With a second non monitoring lender who can become informed following the other lender’s audit,
the strategies chosen by the parties involve random monitoring and partial information revelation. It is
then still possible to prevent the borrower from always cheating by rewarding him for compliance.
These results are striking in the light of those obtained in Proposition 1 where it is shown that, in a
bilateral setup, information can be disclosed only by monitoring deterministically, and thus at very high
observation cost. The reason for these results is that there are not enough tools to control all incentives.
One instrument, the repayments to the monitoring investor Rs, is used to provide the incentive to
monitor, the incentive to comply and to meet the investor’s participation (ensure non-negative proﬁts):
in particular, RHL = RH + δR is used to provide the incentive to monitor and the incentive to comply,
while RH,R L are used to meet participation. However, while an increase in RH does not aﬀect the
incentive to monitor,21 an increase in RL has an adverse eﬀect on it. Thus RL should be reduced to
21In detected low states the monitor is interested in RHL = RH + δR.
10boost the monitoring incentive, but this is not a viable solution as it not only reduces the investor’s proﬁts,
but also increases the return from cheating (marginal beneﬁto fl y i n g ) . 22 Thus, stronger incentives for
one side make it harder to provide incentives for the other.
When a third party is called to participate to the venture, the repayments to her can be used to better
control the incentives. The monitor can reduce her ﬁnancial participation and thus lower her stake into the
venture. This implies that RH and RL can be lowered to meet the non monitoring investor participation,
while still ensuring non-negative proﬁts to the monitor. In particular, because the incentive to monitor
(6) decreases in RL,23 while the incentive to lie (5) increases in it, RL can be reduced relative to fL and
the saving can be used to repay the non monitoring investor in low states (wL). Limited liability and the
monitor’s risk neutrality imply then that RL can be set to zero and thus wL = fL. Analogously, RH can be
lowered and wH can be increased. Setting wH <w L increases the incentive to monitor and requires a lower
l to keep the monitor’s reaction function unchanged.24 For a given reservation utility equal to the rent
obtained in the bilateral setup, the reduction in l decreases the expected monitoring costs m(1 − p + pl)φ
, liberating resources that can be used to reward the complying borrower δR = fH −RH −wH > 0. This
implies that the initial decrease in RH is only partially compensated by the rise in wH. Through the rise in
δR, compliance becomes more attractive, thus making the equilibrium value of m fall, further increasing
the saving in expected monitoring costs and making even more resources available to raise the rent for
compliance/penalty for misreporting. Thus, the presence of the third party acts as a commitment for the
monitor not to extract all the rent from the borrower.
A last remark for why the share of ﬁnance provided by each party is strictly positive. We cannot
have the monitor ﬁnancing the whole project (α =1 )since non-trivial three-party contracts require the
pure investor getting positive transfers in each state of nature, which is costly to the monitor. This is not
t h ec a s ei ft h ep u r ei n v e s t o rc o ﬁnances the project with a share equal to the expected payoﬀ she is paid
to create incentives. However, the burden of ﬁnancing the project cannot entirely fall on the third party
either (α =0 ) , given that optimally the contract has negative correlation between repayments, which
22Ar e d u c t i o ni nRL aﬀects negatively the investor’s proﬁts via two channels: 1) directly, as it increases the return from
cheating fH −RL and tightens the incentive constraint; 2) indirectly, as a lower RL requires a higher RH to remunerate the
monitoring investor for the capital provided, thus lowering the reward for compliance and further tightening the incentive
constraint. The tighter incentive constraint calls for a higher m to restore indiﬀerence, thus causing an increase in expected
observation cost.
23RL can be seen as the opportunity cost of monitoring: whenever the supervisor receives a low state report and decides
to monitor she gives up a sure payoﬀ of RL and incurs a direct cost φ.
24What is important in our setup to boost incentives is that wH is stricltly less than wL. If wH ≥ wL, the positive eﬀect
on incentives of not repaying the monitor in unmonitored low states (RL =0 ) is entirely or more than entirely oﬀset by the
lower repayment in monitored states (RHL = RH + δR = fH − wH).
11implies that wH <w L = fL <I ,thus violating the participation constraint. Hence α has to be strictly
positive.
Having derived the properties of the three-party contract, we are left with comparing the welfare
properties of this contract form with either of the bilateral ones listed in Proposition 1. This has lead to
the following proposition:
Proposition 3 The two investor contract dominates either of the bilateral contracts with m =1and
0 <l≤ 1, as it involves unambiguously lower observation cost than either of them.
Proof. In appendix.
This proposition shows that the only feasible bilateral contracts, when they are implementable, i.e.
for suﬃciently low observation cost, are dominated by a three-party contract involving higher information
revelation and lower monitoring probability. Thus, the involvement of third parties into the venture gives
a result which is at least Pareto superior to either of the single monopolistic lender contracts listed in
Proposition 1. When these are not implementable,25 third parties not only increase eﬃciency, but ensure
project realisation.26
5C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
We have studied the properties of the contract among an informed borrower and one or two uninformed
lenders, one of whom is endowed with the right to audit, under limited liability, non-veriﬁable and non-
contractible monitoring. Within a setting in which the bargaining initiative is held by the monitoring
lender, the novelty of the paper has been to allow for multiple ﬁnancing sources.
Taking as a benchmark the model with a single monopolistic lender, in which information revelation
can never be elicited because of the inability of the lender to commit not to extract all the rent from
the borrower, we have shown that third uninformed lenders with no monitoring and no bargaining power
can ameliorate this incentive problem: in particular, the monitoring lender can “use” the non-monitoring
one and set the transfers so as to reduce their spread across states, thus leaving the borrower with some
rent in truthful high state reports. This mitigates the borrower’s incentive to cheat and the lender’s
incentive to audit, thus restoring partial information revelation. As a consequence of the smoothing out
25For example because the observation costs are too high for m =1to be optimal.
26One may wonder whether reducing project size so as to ensure the feasibility of a single repayment contract with l =1
and m =0dominates employing a third party. This really depends on observation cost and on the degree of risk aversion
of the third party. Although interesting, the issue is beyond the point of this study, which has analysed the impact of a
given allocation of bargaining power when the investment size is ﬁxed.
12of repayments, we also ﬁnd that the two lender scenario is Pareto superior to the single monopolistic
lender contract, when this exists, i.e. when the observation cost is not too high to rule out also a contract
with deterministic monitoring. When the observation cost is so high relative to the expected return from
monitoring that the lender has no longer an incentive to monitor, there is a breakdown of the market. In
such circumstances, the importance of the third party is not limited to improving eﬃciency, as it is when
the contract oﬀer comes from the informed party, but to ensure project realisation, and thus to ensure
that the surplus that can arise from the project does not get lost.
The results show the crucial importance of the allocation of the bargaining initiative in shaping the
lender-borrower relationship and gives to third parties the role of improving the incentives for compliance
and monitoring. Of course, as the problem arises from the interplay of the lender’s bargaining power and
her inability to commit to monitor, various other devices could be used in alternative to (or jointly with)
multiple ﬁnancing sources to improve incentives. Increasing the transparency of the audit procedures
could be a useful step ahead; asking the entrepreneur to provide a collateral as a guarantee for the loan
received, or increase the competition among monitoring lenders, would be other viable, and maybe more
direct routes.
Finally, we have not analysed collusion problems arising in this setting. Generally the costly state
veriﬁcation literature has focused on those arising when a third party, usually a supervisor, is used to
perform the monitoring (Tirole (1986), Kofman and Lawarrée (1993), Strausz (1997)). In our context,
collusion might arise between the monitor and the borrower: the ﬁrst might give up her audit right
in exchange for a higher repayment at expense of the other lender. However, the particular structure
of repayments, namely the negative correlation between repayments, implies that such an agreement is
never going to hurt the non monitoring lender, thus strongly limiting the scope for collusion. Of course
other agreements might be thought of, but we leave the analysis of this and other interesting cases for
future research.
A Appendix
A.1 Alternative contractual structures
The paper has analysed the case in which there is a monopolistic lender who oﬀers a contract to a
borrower and to a non-monitoring lender (centralised contractual structure in ﬁgure 2). Alternative
structures might be thought of in this context: in the ﬁrst structure (a in ﬁg. 2), the monitoring lender
acts as an intermediary between the borrower and the depositors, by collecting funds from depositors and
13lending them to the borrower. Because at the contracting stage only the borrower has private information,
the intermediary and the depositor contract under symmetric information. Since the intermediary is risk
neutral while depositors are risk averse, there is perfect risk sharing and depositors get a ﬂat return
across states. Asymmetric information has therefore no impact on depositors but only on intermediaries
who, having raised capital from depositors, contract with ex ante informed borrowers. This case has been
analysed in section 3.
The second setup (structure b in ﬁg. 2) is one in which the monitoring lender contracts with the
borrower who in turns contracts with the non-monitoring lender. If monitoring is unobservable, the only
way for the borrower to persuade the non-monitoring lender to grant him credit is by proposing her a
contract with repayments non-increasing in cash ﬂows.27 The transfer that maximises the share of ﬁnance
provided by the non-monitoring lender is a ﬂat transfer equal to low state cash ﬂows fL. The residual is
therefore provided by the monitor and the problem becomes again one of studying the ﬁnancial contract
between the monitoring lender and the borrower as the one that has been studied in section 3, with the
peculiarity that fL is zero, as it is seized by the non-monitoring lender, and the investment provided by
the monitor is less than I.
The only other possibility is then to have the monitor oﬀering a contract to both the borrower and
the non-monitoring lender (centralised structure in ﬁg. 2). As shown in section 4, the results of this






















Fig. 2: Contractual structures
27Otherwise the borrower would always claim the state to be low.
14A.2 The equilibria of the reporting-monitoring game
To show which are the feasible equilibria of the reporting-monitoring game between the lender and the
borrower, we use (1) and (3) setting wH = wL = δw =0 .
(i) l =0 , 0 <m≤ 1 requires ∂EπM
∂m |l=0 = −(1 − p)φ ≥ 0 to give m positive, which is impossible.
(ii) m = l =0requires ∂EπB
∂l |m=0 = p(RH − RL) < 0 to give l =0 . This leads to RH <R L ≤ fL,
which falls short of the size of the loan as fL <I .Anticipating this, no contractual agreement can be
reached.
(iii) m =0 , 0 <l<1 requires ∂EπB
∂l |m=0 : RH = RL ≤ fL, which implies that the borrower pays out
at most fL in any state. Again, this does not suﬃce to repay the loan as fL <Iand thus no contract
will be signed.
(iv) m =0 ,l=1implies that, by lying all the time and never being monitored, the borrower pays
out at most fL in any state, and thus no contractual agreement can be reached.
(v) l =1 , 0 <m<1 requires
∂EπB
∂l |0<m<1 = RH − (1 − m)RL − m(RH + δR) > 0
∂EπM
∂m |l=1 = p(RH + δR − RL) − φ =0




(1 − m)RL +( 1− p)m(RL − φ)+pm(RH + δR − φ) − I
fH − (1 − m)RL − m(RH + δR) ≥ 0
fL ≥ RL,R H >R L




fH − (1 − m)RL − m(RH + δR) ≥ 0
fL ≥ RL,R H >R L
As for the case in which m =0and l =1 , this equilibrium is infeasible. From the objective, because the
low state repayment is no higher than fL and fL <I,the payoﬀ to the lender is negative, which implies
that no contractual agreement can be reached under these circumstances.
15(vi) l = m =1requires
∂EπB
∂l |m=1 = δR > 0
∂EπM
∂m |l=1 = p(RH + δR − RL) − φ>0.
Using m = l =1 , the problem becomes
max
RH,RL,m
p(RH + δR)+( 1− p)RL − φ − I
fH − RH − δR ≥ 0
fL ≥ RL
Because the terms of the contract are such that the borrower always cheats and the lender always monitors,
the lender either gets the low state payoﬀ (RL), or the penalty for misreporting (RH +δR). The borrower
receives no rent in either state, otherwise the monitor could raise RH + δR and RL to her beneﬁt. The
expected payoﬀ to the monitor is therefore given by pfH +( 1− p)fL − I − φ,w i t ho b s e r v a t i o nc o s tφ.
(vii) m =1 ;0<l<1 requires
∂EπB
∂l |m=1 = −δR =0
∂EπM
∂m |0<l<1 = pl(RH + δR − RL) − (1 − p + pl)φ>0. (18)
Using m =1and δR =0 , the problem reduces to
max pRH +( 1− p)RL − I − (1 − p + pl)φ
fH − RH ≥ 0
fL − RL ≥ 0
Because of deterministic monitoring, in each state the monitor receives the correct state transfer. The
borrower receives no rent in either state, otherwise the monitor could raise RH + δR and RL to her
beneﬁt. The expected payoﬀ to the monitor is therefore given by pfH +( 1− p)fL − I − (1 − p + pl)φ,
with expected observation cost (1 − p + pl)φ.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . To prove the existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium in programme
PMI,i ts u ﬃces to show that there is a positive penalty associated with misreporting. The proof proceeds
as follows: ﬁrst we prove that α>0, then that wH <w L; next that the borrower gets a rent only in high
truthfully reported states, i.e. that δR > 0, and no rent in any other state. Setting up the Lagrangian:
Λ = p(1 − l)RH +( 1− p + pl)RL − αI + λ1(fH − wH − RH)+λ2(fL − wL − RL)
+λ3(fH − wH − RH − δR)+λ4[µUH +( 1− µ)UL − u]+τ1α + τ2 (1 − α)
16where µ = p(1 − l)+plm, UH = U(wH − (1 − α)I) and UL = U(wL − (1 − α)I), we get the following
FOC’s:
dΛ








RH+wH+δR−RL−wL = λ1 + λ3 (19)
dΛ
















































= τ1 − τ2 (24)





dwL,w eh a v e :
λ1 + λ2 + λ3 =1=λ4[µU0
H +( 1− µ)U0
L] (25)
The non monitoring lender is thus held down to her reservation utility level. Moreover, from ∂Λ
∂RH − ∂Λ
∂δ :
λ1 = p(1 − l)+λ4
pl(UH−UL)
RH+wH+δR−RL−wL, (26)
whence we deduce that a necessary condition for λ1 =0is that wH <w L.
• 0 <α<1
Using (25) we deduce from (24) that τ1 = τ2. Thus, either the multipliers are both positive, or they
are both zero. τ1 > 0 implies α =0 , and τ2 > 0 implies α =1 , which is impossible. Thus both multipliers
must be zero, which implies that the share of funding provided by each lender is strictly positive.
• wH <w L
From the non monitoring lender’s participation constraint, in ﬁr s tb e s t( EUFB) and in second best
(EUSB), we have respectively:
pU(wH − (1 − α)I)+( 1− p)U(wL − (1 − α)I)=u
µU(wH − (1 − α)I)+( 1− µ)U(wL − (1 − α)I)=u.
whence, in the wL − wH space
dwL































i.e. EUFB crosses EUSB from above.


















∂RL,s o l v i n gf o rλ1 + λ3 and λ2 respectively (assuming they are positive), substituting













1−µ is the marginal rate of substitution for the non monitoring lender between wH and wL
at wH = wL. The right hand side can be interpreted as the marginal rate of substitution for the
monitor between RH and RL. The borrower does not seem to take part in this repayments determination
problem: actually he is not interested in the distribution of repayments between the two lenders, but only
in (minimising) their total amount (RH + wH,R L + wL). Conversely for the lenders there is a trade oﬀ
between the remuneration each of them can get with respect to the other. For example, minimising the
repayments to the non monitoring lender allows the monitoring one to maximise her own remuneration.
We can represent in an Edgeworth box the distribution of revenues between the lenders and the trade
oﬀ between transfers (Fig. 3). In the wH,w L s p a c ew er e p r e s e n tt h eﬁrst best and second best utility
contours for the non monitoring lender as derived from (27) and (28). Opposite the wH,w L space, we










The monitor is better oﬀ the higher the transfers she receives and therefore the lower the transfers received
by the non monitoring lender. If wH = wL, then from (31) we have −φ =0which is a contradiction.
Hence:














28From (33) descends that the RHS is non-positive, whence it follows that, because the numerator is positive, also the
denominator is positive.
18which means that along the 45◦ line, in the wH,w L space, the monitor’s isoproﬁt contour is steeper than
the non monitoring lender’s indiﬀerence curve; for well-behaved functions, the equilibrium must lie to the










Fig. 3: The repayments space
• λ2 > 0
Using wH <w L in ∂Λ
∂RL and the result in footnote 28, we get:









whence λ2 > 0.
• λ1 =0 ,λ 3 > 0 ⇒ δR > 0
We can ﬁr s tu s ead i r e c ta r g u m e n tt os h o wt h a ta tl e a s to n eo ft h eb o r r o w e r ’ sh i g hs t a t ep a r t i c i p a t i o n
constraints (audited or non-audited) is binding, i.e. either fH−wH−RH−δR > 0 and fH−wH−RH =0 ,
or fH − wH − RH − δR =0and fH − wH − RH > 0. If they were both slack, then the monitor could
raise either RH or δR to her beneﬁt and still satisfy the borrower’s utility.
Suppose then that λ3 =0and λ1 > 0, that is to say that δR < 0 (fH − wH − RH − δR > 0 and
fH − wH − RH =0 ). From ∂Λ
∂RH /∂Λ






RH+δR−RL−φ − pm(1 − l)]




19which is negative, so long as RH + δR + wH − RL − wL > 0 and is a contradiction. Hence δR ≮ 0.
Another possibility is then to have λ3 > 0 and λ1 > 0, i.e. δR =0(fH − wH − RH − δR =0and
fH−wH−RH =0 ). We will prove that this is also impossible. The proof proceeds as follows: we consider
the slope of the utility functions of the borrower (B)a n dt h et w ol e n d e r s( PM,P NM)w h e nδR =0and




















dwH |B = −1. (36)
Notice that the sign of the non monitoring lender’s indiﬀerence curve is ambiguous. However the slope








Hence for δR =0one of the following must hold (see ﬁg. 4):
1. the non monitoring lender utility function is ﬂatter than the borrower’s, i.e. dδR
dwH|PNM|δR=0 > dδR
dwH |B;












Fig.4: Corner solutions for δR
We will ﬁnd contradictions for each of these cases.







29Because of this, the borrower’s utility cannot be maximal in δR =0 , b u ti ti sp o s s i b l et oi n c r e a s ei tb ys e t t i n gδR > 0.
20From ∂Λ
∂δ/ ∂Λ
∂wH, substituting out λ1 + λ3 from ∂Λ












+ p(1 − l) (39)
Rearranging, λ1 becomes:


















which, using (38), is negative and hence impossible.
























which is negative and rules also this latter case out as a possible solution. Hence δR £ 0.
Last, notice that a tangency might also occur at δR =0between the non monitoring lender and
the borrower’s utility functions, i.e. dδR
dwH |PNM|δR=0 = dδR
dwH|B. We can rule out this case as the possible
solution since, if a tangency occurred at δR =0 ,t h a ti st os a y :−pU0
H =
pl(UH−UL)
RH+wH−RL−wL, then by (39)
λ1 could be written as:
λ1|δR=0 = −
pl(RH−RL)
RH−RL−φ < 0 (43)
which is a contradiction.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .
T op r o v et h i sw ec o m p a r et h ee x p e c t e do b s e r v a t i o nc o st with multiple investorsw h e nam i x e ds t r a t e g y
equilibrium arises, and those with a single investor. We denote the former as EMC2 = m2 (1 − p + pl2)φ.
As for the latter, in section 1 (appendix) it has been shown that with a single investor and ﬁxed loan
size the only feasible equilibria involve deterministic monitoring (m1 =1 )and random (or deterministic)
misrepresentation (0 <l 1 ≤ 1), with expected observation cost EMC1 =( 1− p + pl1)φ.
From (18), using RH = fH and RL = fL, we see that l1 ≥
(1−p)φ
p(fH−fL−φ), which is strictly higher than
l2 =
(1−p)φ
p(fH−wH−φ), given that wH <f L. Because m2 < 1=m1, it follows that EMC2 <E MC 1.
21References
[1] Bloise, G. and P. Reichlin 2005, ‘Risk and Intermediation in a Dual Financial Market Economy,’
Research in Economics, forthcoming.
[2] Choe, C. 1998, ‘Contract Design and Costly Veriﬁcation Games,’ Journal of Economic Behavior and
Organization, 34, 327—340.
[3] Diamond, D.W. 1984, ‘Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring,’ Review of Economic
Studies, 51, 393-414.
[4] Hart, O. 1995, ‘Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure,’C l a r e n d o nP r e s s .
[5] Hoﬀ, K. and J.E. Stiglitz 1990, ‘Imperfect Information and Rural Credit Markets—Puzzles and Policy
Perspectives,’ World Bank Economic Review, 4, 235-250.
[6] Hoﬀ, K. and J.E. Stiglitz 1997, ‘Moneylenders and Bankers: Price-Increasing Subsidies in a Monop-
olistically Competitive Market,’ Journal of Development Economics, 52, 429-462.
[7] Jost, P.J. 1996, ‘On the Role of Commitment in a Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed
Principal,’ Journal of Economic Theory, 68 (3), 510-530.
[8] Khalil, F. 1997, ‘Auditing without Commitment,’ Rand Journal of Economics, 28 (4), 629-640.
[9] Khalil, F. and B. Parigi 1998, ‘Loan Size as a Commitment Device,’ International Economic Review,
39 (1), 135-150.
[10] Khan, C.M. and D. Mookherjee 1998, ‘Competition and Incentives with Nonexclusive Contracts,’
Rand Journal of Economics, 29 (3), 443-465.
[11] Kofman, F. and J. Lawarrée 1993, ‘Collusion in Hierarchical Agency,’ Econometrica, 61, 629-656.
[12] Menichini, A. 2001, ‘The Role of Bargaining Power under No Commitment to Audit,’ Scottish Journal
of Political Economy, 48 (3).
[13] Menichini, A. and P. Simmons 2002, ‘Can Liars Ever Prosper?,’ University of York DP 10/02.
[14] Persons, J.D. 1997, ‘Liars Never Prosper? How Management Misrepresentation Reduces Monitoring
Costs,’ Journal of Financial Intermediation, 6, 269-306.
[15] Petersen, M.A. and R.G. Rajan 1994, ‘The Beneﬁts of Lending Relationships: Evidence from Small
Business Data,’ Journal of Finance, 49 (1), 3-37.
22[16] Petersen, M.A. and R.G. Rajan 1995, ‘The Eﬀect of Credit Market Competition on Lending Rela-
tionships,’ Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 407-444.
[17] Sappington, D. 1983, ‘Limited Liability Contracts Between Principal and Agent,’ Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, 29 (1), 1-21.
[18] Simmons, P. and G. Garino 2003, ‘Truth-telling and Varying Liability in Costly State Veriﬁcation
Contracts,’ mimeo.
[19] Strausz, R. 1997, ‘Delegation of Monitoring in a Principal-Agent Relationship,’ Review of Economic
Studies, 64, 337-357.
[20] Tirole, J. 1986, ‘Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations,’ Journal
of Law and Economics, 2 (2), 181-214.
23